This amendment offered by Senator John Warner (R-Virginia) represents a major blow to the Presidents efforts to hold Republicans together in support of his Iraq policy.
UNITED STATES POLICY ON IRAQ.(a) Short Title.—This section may be cited as the “United States Policy on Iraq Act”.(b) Sense of Senate.—It is the sense of the Senate that, in order to succeed in Iraq—(1) members of the United States Armed Forces who are serving or have served in Iraq and their families deserve the utmost respect and the heartfelt gratitude of the American people for their unwavering devotion to duty, service to the Nation, and selfless sacrifice under the most difficult circumstances;(2) it is important to recognize that the Iraqi people have made enormous sacrifices and that the overwhelming majority of Iraqis want to live in peace and security;(3) calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq;(4) United States military forces should not stay in Iraq any longer than required and the people of Iraq should be so advised;(5) the Administration should tell the leaders of all groups and political parties in Iraq that they need to make the compromises necessary to achieve the broad-based and sustainable political settlement that is essential for defeating the insurgency in Iraq, within the schedule they set for themselves; and(6) the Administration needs to explain to Congress and the American people its strategy for the successful completion of the mission in Iraq.(c) Reports to Congress on United States Policy and Military Operations in Iraq.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every three months thereafter until all United States combat brigades have redeployed from Iraq, the President shall submit to Congress an unclassified report on United States policy and military operations in Iraq. Each report shall include, to the extent practicable, the following unclassified information:(1) The current military mission and the diplomatic, political, economic, and military measures, if any, that are being or have been undertaken to successfully complete or support that mission, including:(A) Efforts to convince Iraq’s main communities to make the compromises necessary for a broad-based and sustainable political settlement.(B) Engaging the international community and the region in the effort to stabilize Iraq and to forge a broad-based and sustainable political settlement.(C) Strengthening the capacity of Iraq’s government ministries.(D) Accelerating the delivery of basic services.(E) Securing the delivery of pledged economic assistance from the international community and additional pledges of assistance.(F) Training Iraqi security forces and transferring security responsibilities to those forces and the government of Iraq.(2) Whether the Iraqis have made the compromises necessary to achieve the broad-based and sustainable political settlement that is essential for defeating the insurgency in Iraq.(3) Any specific conditions included in the April 2005 Multi-National Forces-Iraq campaign action plan (referred to in United States Government Accountability Office October 2005 report on Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and Security Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq), and any subsequent updates to that campaign plan, that must be met in order to provide for the transition of security responsibility to Iraqi security forces.(4) To the extent that these conditions are not covered under paragraph (3), the following should also be addressed:(A) The number of battalions of the Iraqi Armed Forces that must be able to operate independently or to take the lead in counterinsurgency operations and the defense of Iraq’s territory.(B) The number of Iraqi special police units that must be able to operate independently or to take the lead in maintaining law and order and fighting the insurgency.(C) The number of regular police that must be trained and equipped to maintain law and order.(D) The ability of Iraq’s Federal ministries and provincial and local governments to independently sustain, direct, and coordinate Iraq’s security forces.(5) The criteria to be used to evaluate progress toward meeting such conditions.(6) A schedule for meeting such conditions, an assessment of the extent to which such conditions have been met, information regarding variables that could alter that schedule, and the reasons for any subsequent changes to that schedule.
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